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Challenging the International Trend

CHALLENGING THE INTERNATIONAL
TREND:
THE CASE FOR ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE INVENTORSHIP IN THE
UNITED STATES
By Ernest Fok*
While international patent regimes have disallowed computers from being
named as inventors on a patent, the U.S. patent regime has an opportunity to
promote innovation and reshape the patent landscape by recognizing artificial
intelligence (“AI”) systems as inventors for patent applications. The main benefit
of this would be driven by computer algorithms that incorporate modern machine
learning techniques to generate patentable subject matter while eliminating the
need for humans in the invention process. This computer algorithm, which will be
referred to in this paper as “inventing-AI,” would not be recognized as inventors
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office because it only allows for
natural persons to be inventors on a patent application.
This paper argues that the U.S. patent regime is poised to tip the global
balance between economic incentives and the cost of society by recognizing
inventing-AI as inventors. This paper will explore the problems posed by the
USPTO’s inventorship requirements, the technology behind inventing-AI and its
creative capabilities, and the current state of AI inventorship among major
international patent regimes. Later, it will address why AI inventorship makes
sense for the U.S. despite the global trend against granting computers such rights.
The U.S. is poised to promote the Constitutional goal of advancing “the progress
of science and the useful arts” for the betterment of society. Lastly, the paper will
briefly discuss some major challenges that would arise from recognizing inventingAI as inventors and a potential solution to mitigate those issues.
*

Ernest Fok is a JD Candidate (2021) at Santa Clara University School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (“AI”) can revolutionize “the nature of the innovation
process and the organization of [research and development].”1 Currently, the
discovery of productive new ideas remains constant despite a sharp climb in
research investment, whether it is looking at drug discovery, semiconductor
research, medical innovation, or efforts to improve crop yields.2 For example,
human researchers have only explored a small snippet of the estimated billions of
“potentially drug-like molecules” in existence.3 These chemists often make
educated guesses as to a compound’s suitability for medicines, drawing upon their
knowledge of molecular structures and chemical properties to synthesize and test
the compound’s efficacy.4 Unfortunately, this often results in failure because
finding that breakthrough molecule has become more difficult and costly as drug
discovery has grown increasingly complex and saturated with data.5 Despite
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries investing significant amounts of
money into research, the number of new drugs based on novel molecules has
remained flat in the past decades.6
This dynamic is changing as modern AI reinvents what it means to innovate.
Methods such as machine learning and deep artificial neural networks enable AI to
recognize images, comprehend language, and explore new molecule
combinations.7 It does so in ways that a human would not consider, such as when
an AI defeated the best human players of the complex board game “Go” using
“winning strategies that no human had thought to try.”8 When applying this to drug
discovery, a deep learning AI trained on vast sets of experimental data and chemical
knowledge “could come up with novel compounds that scientists [have] never
imagined.”9 So why hasn’t AI revolutionized research, development, and
innovation to efficiently make impactful, patentable discoveries?
While these sophisticated AI systems can mimic human acts of intelligence
and creativity, these computers are not recognized as inventors in patent
applications worldwide.10 As recently as January 2020, the European Patent Office
(“EPO”) denied inventorship to inventing-AI because public policy and practicality
1

David Rotman, AI is Reinventing the Way We Invent, MIT Tech. Rev., March 1, 2019, at 60,
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612898/ai-is-reinventing-the-way-we-invent/.
2
Id.
3
Id. at 59.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
David Rotman, AI is Reinventing the Way We Invent, MIT Tech. Rev., March 1, 2019, at 62,
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612898/ai-is-reinventing-the-way-we-invent/.
8
Id. at 61.
9
Id.
10
NOAM SHEMTOV, A STUDY ON INVENTORSHIP IN INVENTIONS INVOLVING AI ACTIVITY 35
(2019).
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considerations outweighed the benefits of recognizing AI systems as inventors.11
The EPO also stated that “the understanding of the term inventor as referring to a
natural person appears to be an internationally applicable standard.”12 Most patent
jurisdictions continue to only recognize human inventorship, creating uncertainty
and friction for those looking to use AI systems to automate the discovery and
creation of patentable subject matter.13 By refusing to recognize AI systems as
inventors, these patent regimes forgo promoting AI as a cost-efficient innovator in
today’s society.
Though the international trend is to maintain the status quo, this paper will
specifically look at why the U.S. patent system is well positioned to deviate from
this international trend against non-human inventorship and recognize AI
inventorship. The discussion is divided into two parts.
Part I begins by describing U.S. inventorship requirements and the problem
it poses for AI systems. The first requirement is that the patent application must
name one or more inventors who must be “individuals,” which excludes non-human
persons such as computers and corporations.14 The second requirement is that the
inventor participates in the conception of an invention.15 Part I identifies and
explains what types of AI systems can satisfy this requirement. Later on, Part I
elaborates on how major international patent regimes are generally approaching AI
inventorship and distinguishes why the U.S. patent system should recognize
inventing-AI as inventors.
Part II details how AI inventorship creates a better environment for
innovation and patenting in the U.S. For instance, the U.S. patent system can gain
a competitive edge by recognizing AI inventorship when other patent regimes have
not. Furthermore, encouraging development and use of machines capable of
independent invention can greatly reduce the cost of invention when combined with
automation. Lastly, AI inventorship can shift behaviours in the patent marketplace
towards behaviours like licensing and open sourcing that provide greater societal
benefit. Extending inventorship to AI systems maximizes the economic and societal
benefits that come with exclusive patent rights. This also comes with challenges
related to patent ownership, which Part II will discuss in detail alongside a proposed
statutory solution to this issue. Lastly, Part II concludes with how the U.S. patent
system stands to positively shape the domestic and international patent landscape
through AI inventorship.

11

See EPO Publishes Grounds for its Decision to Refuse Two Patent Applications Naming a
Machine as Inventor, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.epo.org/newsevents/news/2020/20200128.html.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2137.01 (9th ed. Rev. Jan. 2018) [hereinafter MPEP].
15
See Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1929).
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PART I
I.

THE PROBLEM WITH INVENTORSHIP
To drastically change research and development, AI must be infused into
each step of the inventive process. When human involvement can be minimized or
eliminated through automation, inventing becomes faster and more cost efficient.16
These inventions can then be patented, granting the inventor the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling or importing the invention.17
This government-sanctioned monopoly provides a valuable incentive to innovate,
but problems arise where AI obviates the need for humans in the creative process.
Under the Patent Act, “whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent.”18 Inventorship focuses on who invented
the patent’s subject matter19, and the inventor who conceives of the invention does
not need to reduce it to practice.20 It sets forth two main requirements.
First, a patent application requires one or more inventors to be named,21 and
these individuals then declare themselves as inventor(s) under oath.22 An individual
cannot be a legal entity, such as a corporation.23 Secondly, the inventor(s) must
have participated in the invention’s “conception,” which is defined as “the complete
performance of the mental part of the inventive art.”24 This process includes making
“non-obvious” discoveries.25 It also requires inventors to demonstrate an “inventive
concept” beyond ineligible patent subjects.26 As a result, the inventor creates an
innovation that meets the following conditions for patentability: useful, novel, and
non-obvious.27

16

See Rotman, supra note 1, at 63 (“To really change materials research, you need to attack the
entire process: ‘What are the bottlenecks? You want AI in every piece of the lab’ . . . Machine
learning could speed up each of those steps.”).
17
35 U.S.C. § 154.
18
35 U.S.C. § 101.
19
MPEP § 2137.01 (9th ed. Rev. Jan. 2018) (“Unless a person contributes to the conception of
the invention, he is not an inventor.”).
20
Id. (Reduction to practice is satisfied when a patent application having a sufficient disclosure is
filed or when the invention is actually carried out and is found to work for its intended purpose).
21
Id.
22
35 U.S.C. § 100(f).
23
35 U.S.C. §§ 115-16.
24
Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1929).
25
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
26
Alice Corp. Party Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 271 (2014).
27
35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
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Thus, the main problem presented is whether “a computer autonomously
conceiving of a patentable invention” can satisfy the patent application and “mental
act” requirements.28
II.

THE NAMED INVENTOR(S) REQUIREMENT
A.

In Theory

From a constitutional standpoint, a computer can be an inventor. The U.S.
Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries,” leaving the term “inventor” open to
interpretation.29 In 1973, the Supreme Court held that terms “authors” and
“inventors” have “not been construed in their narrow literal sense but, rather, with
the reach necessary to reflect the broad scope of constitutional principles,”
suggesting that authors and inventors can be defined broadly to promote the
progress of science and useful arts.30 In turn, both a literal and broad interpretation
of the Constitution’s use of “inventor” suggests non-humans can be inventors.
B.

In Practice

However, modern inventorship is limited to natural persons in practice.
Current notions of conception are confined exclusively to natural persons because
AI has no mind to complete the “mental act” required to invent or discover.31
Moreover, the Supreme Court has more recently interpreted patent-eligible subject
matter as “anything under the sun that is made by man,” suggesting only humans
can generate inventions.32 Furthermore, the Dictionary Act provides that “[i]n
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress . . . the [word] . . . 'individual,'
shall include every infant member of the species homo sapiens.”33 Likewise,
Congress has stated that corporations cannot be named as an inventor.34 Lastly, the
Federal Circuit stated that “only natural persons may be ‘inventors’”35 and that
“[p]eople conceive, not companies,” suggesting legal persons such as businesses
are not capable of conception.36 Legal precedence so far only supports human
inventorship.

28

Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and Future of Patent Law, 57
B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1096 (2016).
29
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
30
Goldstein v. Cal., 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
31
Daryl Lim, AI & IP: Innovation & Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change, 52 AKRON L.
REV. 813, 858 (2018).
32
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (emphasis added).
33
1 U.S.C. § 8(a).
34
35 U.S.C. § 100(f).
35
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (referring to 35
U.S.C. §§ 115-118).
36
New Idea Farm Equip. Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 916 F.2d 1561, 1566 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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From an academic perspective, several scholars have emphasized that
exclusive human inventorship is critical. One view is that inventorship is a moral
right where inventors have a right to receive credit for their works.37 This is seen
as complementary to the utilitarian view of patents as rewards for inventors that
bravely “releas[e] intellectual property to the world.”38 It supports the social norm
that drives inventors to patent.39 For example, the patent itself acts as a credential
for the inventor to signal to society that the inventor of the patent is worthy of
respect.40 These rights do not apply to artificial intelligence systems that lack
consciousness and self-awareness.41
III.

THE “MENTAL ACT” REQUIREMENT
Though modern AI does not possess volition, it is technologically capable
of creativity and imagination to satisfy the “mental act” required for invention.42
Human inventorship continues to dominate because computers have
commonly been used as tools to assist human inventors to reduce an invention to
practice, but are not often participating in the invention’s conception—a mandatory
requirement for inventorship.43 With more recent AI developments, computers took
on a more “substantive role” in the inventive process by automating data analysis
or conducting pattern recognition, but may still fail to contribute to conception44
because the computer is merely implementing statistical or mathematical concepts
in a series of routine and ordinary tasks under Alice.45 However, AI has grown more
sophisticated by moving from a simple program that executes a static algorithm
implemented by a human programmer to a complex system utilizing artificial
neural networks and machine learning that mimics the dynamic aspects of human

37

Jason Rantenen & Sarah E. Jack, Patents as Credentials, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 311, 314
(2019); see Czarnik v. Illumina, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 252, 256 (D. Del. 2006) (concluding that
the plaintiff had standing to correct inventorship because “he ha[d] suffered harm to his
reputation and standing in the scientific community”); see also Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d
1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[B]eing considered an inventor of important subject matter is a
mark of success in one's field . . . Pecuniary consequences may well flow from being designated
as an inventor.”).
38
Rantenen, supra note 37, at 316.
39
Rantenen, supra note 37, at 315-16.
40
Rantenen, supra note 37, at 316.
41
Shemtov, supra note 10, at 35.
42
See Abbott, supra note 28, at 1083.
43
Abbott, supra note 28, at 1093.
44
Abbott, supra note 28, at 1093.
45
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (2014) (The Court set forth a two-prong test for determining patenteligibility, in which the first step is determining whether the claims are directed to a patentineligible concept, such as an abstract idea and, if so, the second step is considering “the elements
of each claim both individually and as an ordered combination to determine whether the
additional elements transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application”, in search
for an “inventive concept.”) (internal quotation and citations omitted).
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creativity.46 These techniques emulate the brain’s broad methods for processing
information, but without human constraints such as the body’s limited energy
output or skull size.47 They enable modern AI to learn and adapt to novel situations
by using training data and learning algorithms to generate predictions beyond what
it was originally programmed for,48 suggesting that the computers are operating in
a non-routine, transformative manner to generate inventions that meets the patent
subject matter eligibility requirements set forth in Mayo and Alice.49 Though
humans are “necessarily involved in the creative process” whether its developing
or using AI, there should be no reason for these humans to qualify as the inventor
where the AI “autonomously develop[s] useful information” and “creates a
patentable result in an area not foreseen” by its creator or user.50 These
developments suggest that inventorship should be extended AI systems
autonomously capable of independent invention. These systems, henceforth
referred to as “inventing-AI,” are capable of the “mental act” required for
inventorship in instances where no natural person has contributed to the invention’s
conception. To understand how inventing-AI invents like humans do, it is important
to briefly delve into the technology.
IV.

INVENTING AI
Inventing-AI are artificial intelligence systems that can be categorized as
“weak AI” or “strong AI” that are “capable of the same level of invention and
creativity as any individual person.”51 As a result, these systems can perform the
mental act required of inventors.
Weak AI systems are designed to solve a narrowly tailored problem such as
winning in well-defined board games or creating new toothbrush designs, whereas
strong AI represents generalized intelligence akin to human mental capabilities
such as reasoning and problem solving.”52 An example of this is IBM’s Watson,
which utilizes logical deduction, statistical regression models, and massive
databases of human knowledge and expertise to mimic human creativity in a wide
variety of settings such as competing on complex human game shows like
Jeopardy! or developing new food recipes.53

46

Russ Pearlman, Recognizing Artificial Intelligence (AI) as Authors and Inventors Under U.S.
Intellectual Property Law, 24 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 2, 37 (2018).
47
Hal Hodson, DeepMind and Google: The Battle to Control Artificial Intelligence, THE
ECONOMIST (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.1843magazine.com/features/deepmind-and-google-thebattle-to-control-artificial-intelligence.
48
Sikander Khan, Associate, Haynes, Beffel & Woldfeld LLP, Lecture at Santa Clara University
School of Law (Oct. 30, 2019).
49
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
50
Abbott, supra note 28, at 1095.
51
Pearlman, supra note 46, at 11.
52
Pearlman, supra note 46, at 11; see also Abbott, supra note 28, at 1084-86.
53
Abbott, supra note 28, at 1090-91.
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Whether classified as weak or strong AI, inventing-AI utilizes machine
learning which “involves building and adapting [computational] models” that
“teach computers how to learn and act without being explicitly programmed.”54
Artificial neural networks are an example of one type of machine learning model.
These neural networks are digital embodiments that simulate the human brain’s
“fundamental mechanisms responsible for idea formation,” thus enabling the
system to generate novel patterns of information and adapt to new scenarios without
additional human input.55 The AI’s software adaptations are not coded by human
beings. Instead, the AI undergoes a self-assembling process by modifying how its
artificial neural networks communicate with each other as the system encounters
input data,56 much like how the human brain’s neurons communicate with each
other to understand and adapt to inputs from human senses.57 There are also several
other machine learning algorithms that are “not modeled after the human brain or
evolutionary processes” but still enable inventing-AI to generalize information and
knowledge in ways that even human experts have difficulty achieving.58 Given
these technological developments, inventing-AI can perform the mental acts
required for human inventorship.
In fact, this has been indirectly recognized by the U.S. Patent Office
(“USPTO”). In 2005, Dr. John Koza was awarded the patent on an invention
created by an inventing-AI known as the “invention machine,” which utilized
genetic programming (modeled after evolutionary processes) to create an
improvement to a known controller system without the aid of a “database of expert
knowledge” and “without knowledge about existing controllers.”59 The prosecution
history did not mention the use of AI to develop the invention, and the patent was
issued to Dr. Koza despite Koza’s admission that “his legal counsel advised . . . that
[Koza’s] team consider themselves inventors” even though “the whole invention
was created by a computer.”60 Despite this admission, the USPTO “seem[ed] to
require only that a natural person be registered for the patent” and upheld the patent
because the application “[met] its other stringent requirements.”61 In this instance,
the patent application listed a human inventor who did not take part in conception.
This example illustrates that an AI system can conceive an invention satisfying
inventorship and substantive patent requirements in the U.S.

54

DeepAI, What is Machine Learning?, https://deepai.org/machine-learning-glossary-andterms/machine-learning (last visited Dec. 13, 2020).
55
Abbott, supra note 28, at 1084-85.
56
Abbott, supra note 28, at 1084-85.
57
DeepAI, supra note 54.
58
Abbott, supra note 28, at 1088-89.
59
Abbott, supra note 28, at 1087; U.S. Patent No. 6,847,851 (filed July 12, 2002) (issued Jan. 25,
2005) (listing Dr. John Koza as the inventor for an AI-generated invention that involved no
human intervention; AI’s involvement not disclosed to Patent Office).
60
Abbott, supra note 28, at 1088.
61
Pearlman, supra note 46, at 23.
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Where inventing-AI generated patentable subject matter and met the
substantive novelty, non-obvious, and useful requirements, the U.S. patent regime
has indirectly, though not officially, recognized AI inventorship.

V.

THE CURRENT STATE OF AI INVENTORSHIP
To better contextualize what the U.S. patent system can gain from
recognizing AI inventorship, it is important to understand how other major patent
regimes are approaching this topic.
A.

Global Trend

As reported in a recently commissioned 2019 study by the EPO broadly
discussing AI inventorship across prominent patent regimes, none of the major
patent jurisdictions (U.S., China, Japan, Republic of Korea, European Union) allow
for AI systems to be inventors.62 Notably, each jurisdiction differed in its
terminology and tests to define an inventor but maintained an overall uniform
objective: “to identify the person that was responsible, wholly or partially, for what
may be described as the intelligent and creative conception of the invention.”63
Delving further, the study detailed the EPO’s “strict definition of inventorship
limited to humans” and why this policy is “suitable for the legal and technological
landscape both at present and in the near future.” 64 The study emphasizes three
main rationales for the EPO’s approach and generalizes them to explain why
recognizing AI inventorship is unnecessary for other patent regimes.
First, extending inventorship beyond natural persons would have largely
negative consequences.65 For instance, the European Patent Convention’s (“EPC”)
framework safeguards the inventor’s right of entitlement and right of attribution
under EPC Article 60.66 These rights are valued by human inventors, but would be
meaningless when applied to an AI system.67 These rights provide value to human
inventors. The two main functions relate to personhood interests: (1) creating a
pecuniary incentive to invent and (2) increasing reputational gain.68 Granting such
rights would entail granting personhood to the inventing-AI, but the ensuing legal
hurdles make these solutions a mere gesture at best and very impractical at worst.69
For example, concepts of ownership and employment cannot be successfully
applied to AI systems under the EPO’s legal framework since AI systems cannot
own property nor can they be a party to employment relationship.70 Thus, there are
62

Shemtov, supra note 10, at 5.
Shemtov, supra note 10, at 5.
64
Shemtov, supra note 10, at 34.
65
Shemtov, supra note 10, at 8.
66
Shemtov, supra note 10, at 25.
67
Shemtov, supra note 10, at 24-25.
68
Shemtov, supra note 10, at 23 (citing Jeanne Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual
Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745 (2012)).
69
Shemtov, supra note 10, at 27.
70
Shemtov, supra note 10, at 6.
63
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no “convincing rationales” to apply the EPC rules on attribution and entitlement to
an AI system.71 In applying this to the present legal landscape, other major patent
regimes are “not equipped to facilitate a definition of inventorship that includes AI
systems” because inventorship involves concepts of ownership, employment, and
entitlement that are meaningless to AI systems.72
Second, the study anticipates AI inventorship being unwarranted even if the
technology advances so significantly that the process of invention would be so
removed from human involvement that no human actor could be considered an
inventor.73 It found that patents with substantial AI involvement are still likely to
be granted even without the recognition of computers as inventors as long as human
inventors can be identified.74 For instance, EPO policy dictates that the person who
recognizes the importance and utility of the invention is also an inventor.75 This
approach is shared by “all of the relevant patent jurisdictions grant patents where
the inventor comes by the core of the inventive concept . . . by dumb luck rather
than real inventive effort.”76 When applying this to inventing-AI, the person who
selects the machine learning algorithms, chooses the relevant parameters, or
identifies the input data could be an inventor even if the inventing-AI’s output was
somewhat unpredictable. Since AI systems involve many actors—such as
programmers, users, and investors—identifying who is an inventor should be
carried out on a case-by-case basis.77 The study recommends that other patent
regimes would benefit from approaching inventions that involve AI activity in a
similar manner because it would establish a uniform position towards
inventorship.78
In sum, the report concludes that the “present legal landscape” for major
patent regimes is “not equipped to facilitate a definition of inventorship that
includes AI systems.”79 The legal arguments against AI inventorship expressed in
the EPO’s study are applicable to the U.S. patent regime. However, the U.S. patent
regime could embrace AI inventorship to shift the patent landscape and capitalize
on the growing investment in AI technologies.

71

Shemtov, supra note 10, at 34.
Shemtov, supra note 10, at 35.
73
Shemtov, supra note 10, at 34.
74
Shemtov, supra note 10, at 24.
75
Shemtov, supra note 10, at 21 (“Whether encountering the inventive concept of the invention
by pure luck and realizing its utility and significance or whether by doing so after examining the
output of an AI system, the relevant person may be considered as the inventor and their
involvement may be described as intellectual or creative conception.”).
76
Shemtov, supra note 10, at 35.
77
Shemtov, supra note 10, at 31.
78
Shemtov, supra note 10, at 35.
79
Shemtov, supra note 10, at 35.
72
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United States

First, the Patent Act requires that an inventor be listed on a patent
application.80 Listing a natural person who did not participate in conceiving of an
inventing-AI’s invention may give rise inequitable conduct.81 This also applies to
patent applicants who intentionally falsify inventorship to the USPTO on any
issued patent.82 In this instance, the inventing-AI’s programmer or end-user would
not be classified as a joint inventor. Humans can provide machines with a task and
materials needed to invent, but this does not make her an inventor. Inventorship
requires contributing to the conception of the invention, and inventors may adopt
ideas, suggestions, and materials from others as long as they maintain intellectual
dominion over making the invention.83 Similarly, a programmer or user who directs
the inventing-AI to generate inventions within a given domain may not qualify as
a co-inventor.84 Patentees seeking to enforce their rights might have their suits
dismissed for non-joinder if a court determines that the patent does not name all
joint inventors.85 In light of this, there appears to be no case law or controversies
related to non-human inventors, so it is likely that an AI would not qualify as a sole
inventor, let alone as a joint inventor.86
Despite these hurdles, inventorship over the inventing-AI’s invention is
possible because a person may qualify as an inventor by being the first individual
to recognize and appreciate an existing invention.87 Under this circumstance, a
person discovers rather than creates an invention. It follows that the person’s
understanding of the invention’s importance would qualify the person as an
inventor.88 This suggests any inventing-AI’s inventions are only patentable when
an individual subsequently discovers them.89 While this is a solution, it raises a
80

35 U.S.C § 111(a).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers . . . may obtain a patent thereof, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”); 35 U.S.C. § 115(a) (“An application for patent . . .
shall include, or be amended to include, the name of the inventor for any invention claimed in the
application.”).
82
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challenging question of who should be listed as the inventor—should it be the AI
programmer, the end-user, the person providing the training data, or the AI creator?
Allowing AI inventorship may shift this analysis to a more efficient point in the
patenting timeline.
Second, though the EPO-commissioned study suggests that inventing-AI is
still in its infancy such that its inventive processes can always be attributable human
involvement, the USPTO has already unknowingly granted patents for inventions
created by inventing-AI.90
Third, the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries, leaving
the term “inventor” open to interpretation.91 In August 2019, the USPTO requested
comments on patent-related issues regarding AI inventions to decide how to
interpret “inventor.”92 This question was decided in April 2020, when the USPTO
issued a final decision93 concerning two recent patent applications simultaneously
filed with the USPTO and EPO that listed an inventing-AI as the inventor: one for
an improved beverage container, the other for a light-emitting device used in
search-and-rescue missions.94 The EPO refused these two patent applications in
November 2019, stating that the European patent framework requires an inventor
designated in a European patent to be natural person.95 The U.S. came to a similar
conclusion in April 2020, relying on “current statutes, case law, and USPTO
regulations and rules” to “limit inventorship to natural persons.”96
PART II
I.

CONSIDERING AI INVENTORSHIP IN THE U.S.
AI inventorship has not been recognized in the U.S. despite a dramatic
increase in the development and use of AI technologies. In 2017, an economic study
showed that 550 start-ups using AI as a core part of their products raised $5 billion
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in funding with 60% of that funding going into American companies.97 Moreover,
the American Intellectual Property Law Association estimated the annual
investments directly in AI technologies in 2017 reached $26-39 billion.98 Alongside
this investment, the employment market for deep learning researchers has boomed
with some researchers obtained through mergers and acquisitions being valued at
nearly $10 million.99 AI commercialization is expected to reach $190 billion by
2025.100
While investment in AI has dramatically increased, the USPTO has not been
receiving a similar increase in applications claiming computers as the inventor.101
This suggests that applicants are choosing not to disclose the AI in the inventive
process.102 This trend of obscuring AI involvement in the inventive process
highlights the legal risks of listing a non-human inventor. While the practice of
listing humans who utilize inventing-AI has worked for the U.S. system so far, it
fails to further incentivize the use of inventing-AI.103 For example, corporations,
research institutions, and investors may be dissuaded from using inventing-AI to
fully automate innovation because it amplifies the uncertainty and administrative
burden of obtaining a patent on the resulting invention. By requiring a natural
person to be listed as an inventor, the U.S. unnecessarily maintains a cost-inefficient
status quo. Should the U.S. recognize AI inventorship, it could drastically change
industries whose R&D costs have been ballooning just to maintain historical rates
of useful, patentable discoveries.104 AI inventorship is a critical step in unlocking
inventing-AI’s potential to promote innovation within the patent landscape. Several
reasons supporting AI inventorship are discussed below.
II.

SUPPORTING THE ECONOMIC-UTILITARIAN RATIONALE
The rationale for AI inventorship is strongest under a utilitarian-economic
incentive theory (“UEI”) because the Constitution provides “explicit rationale” for
granting patent protection to encourage innovation.105 Inventorship and the
subsequent patent ownership rights are necessary to economically incentivize
97
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investment in innovation, but this must be balanced against the social cost of
granting a government-sanctioned monopoly that can limit the diffusion of
knowledge.106 This balancing is necessary to achieve the ultimate goal of advancing
public welfare.107
A.

Competitive Advantage in Innovation

First, allowing AI inventorship may put the U.S. patent regime at a
competitive advantage relative to its peers.
In the past, the U.S. patent system gained a competitive advantage by
allowing man-made organisms to be patentable subject matter.108 Similarly,
allowing for AI inventorship could spur the use and development of inventing-AI.
To illustrate this, the USPTO allowed the first transgenic animal, the “Harvard
Mouse,” to be patented in the wake of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 47 U.S. 303
(1980), which allowed man-made organisms to be patentable subject matter.109
Biotechnology patents post-Chakrabarty were focused on whether the invention
constituted patentable subject matter, rather than the morality of the invention.110
The USPTO left the ethical questions to the legislature and executive branches.111
The same “Harvard Mouse” patent was submitted to the EPO, but was contested
under EPC Article 53 due to ethical concerns.112 This required the EPO Examining
Division “to weigh the suffering of animals and possible risks to the environment
on the one hand, and the invention's usefulness to mankind on the other.”113 While
the EPO ultimately granted the patent, the codified moral utility requirement
opened grounds for litigation and invalidation within the EPC. The EPC’s lack of
legal certainty and potentially disparate applications of the moral utility doctrine
placed the European patent system at a relative disadvantage to the US patent
system.114
AI inventorship could give the U.S. patent system a similar innovative edge.
Where other regimes hesitate to expand inventorship to inventing-AI, the USPTO
could challenge the status quo. Just as it had deferred judgments of morality
regarding man-made organisms, the USPTO can similarly discount mental acts as
an exclusively human capability. Doing so could focus patent law on the “nature of
106
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the invention itself rather than the subjective mental processes by which an
invention may have been achieved.”115
Allowing AI inventorship would remove the legal uncertainty surrounding
the validity of inventing-AI created patents, thus incentivizing an underutilized
avenue to generate innovative patents. For example, the USPTO has seen increases
in recent years in the number of first and second AI-related patent filings due to the
large community of AI inventors in the U.S.116 and allowing for AI inventorship
could further fuel this trend.
B.

Economic Efficiency

AI inventorship may also increase economic efficiency by lowering the
time, effort, and resources needed to innovate. This is an extension of how AI and
automation represents the next “industrial revolution.”117
First, formally requiring patent applications to list a human inventor adds
friction to the patenting process. AI inventorship removes the need for a human
inventor, potentially lowering the human capital needed to generate novel
inventions. Like most automation, inventing-AI is not bound by human limitations
and can discover patterns and improvements by considering a greater range of prior
art that may extend beyond the typical skilled inventor. With further development,
inventing-AI systems can obviate the need for human input and can create
patentable subject matter on an economically-scalable level.
Secondly, AI inventorship could shift the process of negotiating and
assigning rights to the inventing-AI’s invention.118 Currently, an inventing-AI’s
invention can only be patented if a human took part in the otherwise autonomous,
independent conception process or discovered the invention’s importance.119 This
raises questions about which natural person is the inventor and who subsequently
owns the patent rights. This is challenging since AI inventions often involve
“numerous actors, both overlapping and independent, encompassing software
programmers, data and feedback suppliers, trainers, system owners and operators,
employers, the public and the government.”120 Furthermore, the decision on who
should be listed as the inventor can be challenging when approximately 93% of
patents are assigned to organizations rather than individuals.121 Mechanisms for
transfer include employment and work-for-hire agreements, but not all actors
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involved with the use and development of an inventing-AI may be bound to such
contracts.
UEI theory dictates that society is be best served by allocating patent rights
to the party that can maximize economic efficiency. Economic efficiency is
optimized when the party that most values the patent also owns the patent rights,
though this varies depending on the party and its respective industry.122 Given that
economic efficiency is a case-by-case analysis, allowing inventorship rights (and
subsequent ownership rights that flow from inventorship) to vest in an inventingAI would encourage interested parties to contract or negotiate for transfer of those
rights retrospectively rather than prospectively. Ideally, the party that most values
the patent will be the highest bidder capable of commercializing the AI-produced
invention.123
This can plausibly extend to real world scenarios where a third party designs
an inventing-AI, such as IBM’s Watson, to be distributed for use by other parties.124
These parties could use an instance of Watson on their own hardware, which could
then be trained and adapted to invent within the desired parameters of a given
industry. In this hypothetical, it would be unclear who would claim rights to
Watson’s invention or how that dispute could be resolved in efficient manner. AI
inventorship create possibilities to leverage existing frameworks such as work-forhire and employment agreements to increase economic efficiency.
Lastly, AI inventorship can make inventing-AI economically viable for
companies by reducing the cost to obtain patent rights while ensuring more
knowledge is made publicly available. With less money spent on research and
development, the market monopoly that comes with patent rights becomes more
valuable over other options such as trade secret protection which limits public
disclosure and dissemination of knowledge.125 Such an economic incentive could
rapidly increase patent filings and subsequently enrich society’s access to new
knowledge. Moreover, the U.S. could draw international companies and investors
to capitalize on an innovation-friendly patent system. If successful, it could
incentivize other patent regimes to follow suit given the U.S.’s dominant position
in AI technologies. Increasing patent filings expands the pool of knowledge from
which inventors can draw from, thus further accelerating societal and scientific
progress already being made by AI technology.
C.

Increased Patent Value for Practicing Entities

AI inventorship could also shift the value of patents in the marketplace by
enhancing patent value for practicing entities relative to patent assertion entities.
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The complex patent ecosystem consists of two major entities: practicing
entities (“PE”) and patent-assertion entities (“PAE”).126 PEs are commonly
companies that practice their inventions and use patents to maximize their freedom
to operate.127 In contrast, PAEs are “entities [] focused on the enforcement, rather
than the active development or commercialization of their patents” and can be
further divided into several types such as “large-portfolio companies, smallportfolio companies, and individuals.”128
Both entities employ two board patent strategies to achieve operating
freedom and profitability: a defensive “arm race” strategy and an offensive
“marketplace” strategy.129 The “arms race” strategy involves developing or
purchasing a high quantity of patents with less attention paid to quality.130 The
objective is to build a patent arsenal to defend against the risk of patent litigation,
neutralize lawsuit threats by competitors, and leverage the patent portfolios to
promote cross-licensing while establishing market presence and revenue
streams.131 PEs often adopt a “marketplace” strategy to quickly adapt their patent
portfolios to protect against litigation. Conversely, the “arms race” strategy
involves offensively asserting large patent portfolios that were initially developed
for defensive purposes.132 This includes generating profit through licensing or
organizing company subsidiaries to sue companies in technology areas where the
patent owner does not practice.133 PAEs frequently employ an “arms race” strategy
to use their patent portfolio to offensively to sue or threaten to sue practicing
companies.134
The interplay between PEs and PAEs leads to both entities swinging
between “arms race” and “marketplace” strategies, which increases the social cost
associated with patent rights by (1) lowering patent quality while (2) increasing the
ability of PAEs to hold-up practicing companies from exercising their patent
rights.135 Defensive patenting results in fewer lawsuits, but also has a negative
effect of increasing the number of low-quality and unused patents that can lead to
patent-hold up.136
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In theory, AI inventorship could lower the social cost associated with patent
rights by financially incentivizing companies to employ inventing-AI to create high
quality patents over buying them in the patent marketplace. AI inventorship can
promote inventing-AI as a cost-efficient alternative method to amass patents,
potentially eliminating the need to purchase patents as part of the “arms race.”
Moreover, companies may be less likely to dispose of their patents in the patent
marketplace for lack of strategy value or use. Conversely, smaller PEs can use
inventing-AI to compete with industry giants by first building their own portfolio
with lower time and money investments then later generating capital through
licensing. Both approaches could reduce low quality patents in the marketplace,
effectively limiting an avenue for PAEs to acquire patents for litigating purposes.
AI inventorship could shift the patent ecosystem to favor PEs.137 This can enable
them to innovate faster and with more precision within their industry. Public
welfare benefits when PEs amass more higher quality patents because they gain
greater freedom to operate at lower cost while enriching the patent pool.
Other benefits include engaging in positive cross-licensing or open-source
activity with greater speed and efficiency. For example, the semiconductor industry
benefited when Cisco amassed a large patent portfolio and cross-licensed it to
competitors, which prevented those competitors from blocking Cisco products
while generating royalties.138 Similarly, Sun Microsystems shared its patent
portfolio to support open-source development. By placing its patents into the public
domain, Sun not only capitalized by creating the industry standard in a new field,
but also provided developers with the knowledge and freedom to innovate or create
derivative works from its platform.139 Beyond these activities, patents may also be
assigned or sold while retaining the right to sell the patent and sue for infringement,
which can also keep the patent off the market and further limit PAE activity.140
AI inventorship could more greatly benefit PEs over PAEs in the patent
ecosystem, encouraging more socially beneficial patent practices and behaviors
over innovation-hindering litigation and hold-ups.
PART III
I.

CHALLENGES WITH TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP
Currently, U.S. patent law grants ownership rights to the inventor absent an
assignment. Intellectual property is an alienable personal property right which can
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be transferred, assigned, licensed, or sold.141 For patents, initial ownership is vested
in: (1) the inventor(s) of the patent; (2) an employer via pre-inventive assignments;
or (3) an employer for an employee who was “employed to invent.”142 While
ownership may be assigned to the natural person inventor, it may also be assigned
to non-natural persons such as a corporation via work-for-hire or assignment
contracts.143
In the absence of an assignment, the original applicant is presumed to be the
owner. Where a patent has multiple owners, each owner may exploit the patent
without the consent of the others.145 The owners of a patent gain the “right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States.”146
Where there is only one inventor, and the inventor has not assigned the patent
property, the inventor owns the entire right, title, and interest of the patent
property.147 Thus, if inventing-AI is recognized as an inventor, it would not be able
to own the patent rights to the invention absent an assignment.
144

One solution is extending personhood to include inventing-AI, enabling the
system to own property rights like natural and legal persons.
Several countries have suggested or attempted this approach, but with
limited success. For example, the European Union (“EU”) parliament proposed the
possibility of establishing electronic personhood, but ultimately found this
approach unwarranted given the current state of AI and largely narrow capabilities
of most AI systems.148 Similarly, residency and citizenship were granted to AI
robots in Japan and Saudi Arabia, respectively. However, these were mere “public
relation exercises” to support initiatives by the local government. The rights arising
from these statuses were not elaborated on.149 In practice, Estonia made the most
stride in recognizing electronic personhood within a limited tort liability context so
that citizens could understand who is liable when autonomous vehicles case
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accidents or malfunction.150 However, it is unclear whether the Estonian
government will pass more legislation to broaden these rights to parallel those of
natural persons.151 In these examples, the legal burden associated with granting
personhood to inventing-AI would outweigh its potential economic and societal
benefits.
However, the Patent Act has a statutory provision which could be
effectively transfer ownership rights. Rather than granting personhood, the USPTO
could recognize inventing-AI as a deceased or legally incapacitated inventor under
35 U.S.C. § 409. Under this statute, a legal representative for a deceased or legally
incapacitated inventor can file a patent application on the inventor’s behalf.152
Moreover, the representative can file a statement in lieu of an inventor’s oath or
declaration.153 Most importantly, the statute allows for the patent to be issued to the
legal representative under certain circumstances.154
While this seems like a cumbersome workaround, the statute provides a preexisting framework from which the USPTO can utilize and adapt. It also creates a
solution to the portability of inventing-AI. Inventing-AI can be implemented on a
variety of systems depending on the user’s need, much like how IBM’s Watson is
available to numerous developers and users while Watson remains under IBM’s
ownership.155 The legally incapacitated inventor framework creates an opportunity
for parties involved with the inventing-AI to negotiate and contract for who will
represent the inventing-AI on a patent application for a given invention. Drawing
upon the UEI theory, the ideal legal representative for the inventing-AI would have
the highest economic interest in the invention. The USPTO could reduce friction in
this process by looking to U.S. copyright work-for-hire practices under 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 and enacting a similar provision for patents created by inventing-AI.
II.

CHALLENGES WITH THE “PERSON HAVING ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART”
STANDARD
If inventing-AI becomes more prevalent as a result of AI inventorship, the
element of novelty, non-obviousness, and enablement may become an issue. These
elements are judged according to a person of ordinary skill in the art, who is a
hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the
invention.156 With AI’s ability to sort, store, and access vast quantities of
knowledge beyond what human capabilities, the hypothetical skilled person may
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become a person equipped with an AI system.157 Elevating the “person having
ordinary skill in the art” (“PHOSITA”) standard could greatly affect established
areas of patent law that rely on this standard, including novelty, obviousness, and
enablement.158 As a result, patenting could become more difficult because of the
elevated standard, thus constricting the ability for human inventors to secure
patents.
This issue is relevant whether AI inventorship is adopted or not given the
dramatic investment in AI technology.159 While, AI inventorship may accelerate
the pace at which this change is occurring, allowing inventing-AI could encourage
more AI disclosure on patent applications. This gives the USPTO and other patentreview agencies an opportunity to factor in the use of AI when using the PHOSITA
standard.
III.

OTHER CONSEQUENCES
Aside from legal hurdles, scholars have noted that AI inventorship could
result in potential negative consequences. First, inventing-AI could result in a
dramatic consolidation of intellectual property by large corporations, as these
businesses are the ones most likely to have the resources to develop, maintain, and
deploy these systems.160 Secondly, AI inventorship could lead to such a rapid
proliferation of patents that companies may be rationally incentivized “to sell the
patent for any non-zero sum” on the marketplace, resulting in PAEs having more
access to inexpensive patents to assert against PEs.161 These consequences are
merely possibilities, and they would need to be explored in more detail if AI
inventorship becomes a reality.

CONCLUSION
The U.S. patent system has the potential to strongly benefit from
recognizing inventing-AI as inventors. It would enable the U.S. patent regime to
develop a competitive edge among its peers, encourage investment and use of
inventing-AI, and shift the patent value towards PEs to encourage behavior that
maximizes the social utility of patents. Though the challenges and potential
negative consequences casts a shadow on whether AI inventorship is the best
avenue to promote the Constitutional purpose behind patent rights, the U.S. may
not have a similar prime opportunity to capitalize on a technology that will continue
to see growth and controversy in the patent space.
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